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 New Demographic Evidence on
 Collectivization Deaths:
 A Rejoinder to Stephen Wheatcroft
 Most Western scholars agree that the Soviet Union experienced a significant
 number of excess deaths during the 1930s which are attributable to forced col-
 lectivization from 1929 to 1932, the famine of 1933-34, Gulag forced labor, and
 the terror. Until comparatively recently, however, the official data required for
 a reliable estimate of the magnitude and incidence of these excess fatalities have
 been unavailable. In May 1984 I reported that new evidence had been released
 which shed considerable light on one aspect of this important problem: forced
 collectivization between 1929 and 1932.1 The evidence took two forms: a revised
 natality series for the 1930s, and a previously unpublished population statistic
 for 1933, both provided by the distinguished Soviet demographer Boris Urlanis.2
 On the basis of this information, previously published Soviet vital statistics, and
 1926/27 census data, two alternative estimates of excess deaths attributable to
 forced collectivization were computed.3 The first, derived without adjustment
 from these Soviet statistics and computed using the method employed by Frank
 Lorimer in his classic League of Nations study, The Population of the Soviet
 Union: History and Prospects (1946), indicated that the Soviet Union sustained
 5.8 million excess fatalities from January 1, 1929 to January 1, 1933 that were
 attributable to forced collectivization. The second estimate, which took into ac-
 count the possibility that the official, census-based mortality rate for 1927 may
 have understated the real rate, yielded a lower figure, 5.1 million. These findings
 led me to conclude that the approximately 5 million excess deaths attributed by
 Murray Feshbach to "the liquidation of the kulaks and forced land collectiviza-
 tion in the early thirties" was well founded and broadly substantiated by Urlanis's
 data.4
 As claimed previously, I believe this is a very powerful, if admittedly re-
 stricted, result. It does not settle the further issues of famine-related excess
 deaths in 1933/34 and of excess fatalities imputable to Gulag forced labor and
 1. Steven Rosefielde, "Excess Collectivization Deaths 1929-1933: New Demographic Evidence,"
 Slavic Review, 42, no. 1 (Spring 1984): 83-88. The precise dating is January 1, 1929 to January 1,
 1933.
 2. Wheatcroft chides me for describing Urlanis as a leading-if not the leading-Soviet de-
 mographer, but then shifts his ground and refers to him as "the grand old man of Soviet demography."
 3. Rosefielde, "Excess Collectivization Deaths," tables 1 and Al, pp. 84 and 87.
 4. Murray Feshbach, "The Soviet Union: Population Trends and Dilemmas," Population Bul-
 letin, 37, no. 3 (August 1982): 7. Wheatcroft alleges that Feshbach did not attribute 5 million deaths
 to collectivization as cited above. He accomplishes this by ignoring the distinction drawn in my text
 and Feshbach's between collectivization per se 1929-32 and the famine 1933-34. See Wheatcroft,
 "New Demographic Evidence," and Rosefielde, "Excess Collectivization Deaths," pp. 83 and 88.
 There is some overlap in Feshbach's and my periodization 1932-33, but this ambiguity does not
 justify Wheatcroft's distortion. It should also be noted that Mace insists that the famine ended in
 1933. See James Mace, "Response to Stephen Wheatcroft," Problems of Communism, 34 (March-
 April 1985): 137.
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 the terror. It does not provide a single exact estimate of mortality related to
 excess collectivization,5 and it does not resolve uncertainties that mar the relia-
 bility of all Soviet statistics. Nonetheless, it firmly establishes that official Soviet
 demographic statistics support excess mortality estimates in the vicinity of 5
 million people during forced collectivization between 1929 and 1932.
 Stephen Wheatcroft challenges this statement. He does not contest Lori-
 mer's estimating procedure6 or my arithmetic. Nor does he deny the authenticity
 of Urlanis's new evidence.7 Indeed, he not only acknowledges that Urlanis's 1933
 population estimate is consistent with Lorimer's, but informs us that Urlanis
 personally confirmed his sympathy with Lorimer's estimate in a private inter-
 view.8 Why then does he categorically reject my results?
 Wheatcroft builds his case on two substantive arguments. First he asserts
 that the population statistic for 1933 which I employ is contradicted by an alter-
 native estimate on the preceding page of Urlanis's book Problemy dinamiki na-
 seleniia SSSR, and second that official Soviet demographic statistics exaggerate
 excess mortality between 1929 and 1949.
 The first assertion, as Wheatcroft himself intimates, is baseless.9 The pop-
 ulation statistic I cite appears in a table comparing Gosplan's population growth
 projection from April 1, 1928 to April 1, 1933 with the actual populations (fak-
 ticheskie dannye) on April 1, 1928 and on an unspecified date in 1933.10 The
 latter statistic is marked with an asterisk indicating that it is approximate (pri-
 blizitel'no) with regard either to the true figure on April 1, 1933 or the true
 figure on another unspecified date, presumably January 1, 1933 in accordance
 with standard practice.11 The heading "fakticheskie dannye" indicates that the
 population statistics for 1928 and 1933 are best estimates based on available
 official data.12 No qualifying statements appear in either the table or the accom-
 panying text to suggest that the population statistic for 1933 is casually derived
 from fragmentary unofficial data, or that the term "priblizitel'no" should be
 interpreted as a range rather than a point estimate.
 5. Wheatcroft for rhetorical effect twists the interpretation I place on my findings by asserting
 that "Rosefielde is implying an accuracy within one hundred thousand." See also n. 27.
 6. Wheatcroft accepts Lorimer's excess death estimates subject to various minor qualifications.
 Presumably he believes his estimating procedure is correct, although his comments about inflated
 and noninflated data suggest that he may not fully grasp Lorimer's method.
 7. "Urlanis's estimate of the 1933 population level of approximately 158 million is significantly
 lower than the only Soviet official figures that have ever appeared." Wheatcroft, "New Demographic
 Evidence." Compare discussion of Gertsenzon and Shliapochnikov's 1933 population statistic of 155.1
 million in n. 24.
 8. Ibid., n. 9.
 9. "On one page Urlanis talks about a real 1933 figure of about 160.7 million and on another
 of approximately 158.2 million. This is not necessarily a contradiction." Ibid.
 10. "The Gosplan projection cited by Urlanis referred not to January 1, 1933 as Rosefielde
 claims, but to April 1, 1933." Ibid. I made no such claim. Of course the Gosplan figure is a five-
 year projection point to point April 1, 1928 to April 1, 1933. But this in no way informs us whether
 Urlanis's 1933 population estimate pertains precisely to April 1, 1933 or any other date.
 11. Compare the original Novosel'skii and Paevskii population estimates cited by Urlanis, Prob-
 lemy dinamiki naseleniia (Moscow, 1974), p. 318, and reported in "O svodnykh kharakeristikakh
 vosproizvodstva i perspektivykh ischisleniiakh naseleniia," Trudy demograficheskogo instituta, tom I,
 1934, p. 16.
 12. Wheatcroft's assertion about the unreliability of Urlanis's population statistic for 1933 is
 unconvincing. The fact that there was no census taken in 1931 or 1933 does not mean that other
 sampling procedures were not employed.
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 The alternative population statistic that allegedly contradicts the one I report
 is derived by Wheatcroft from Urlanis's assertion that the population estimate
 computed by Novosel'skii and Paevskii for January 1, 1933 exceeded the true
 population in 1933 by roughly 7 million people. 13 Wheatcroft presumes that the
 "true population" in 1933 refers to January 1, 1933,14 permitting him to infer
 that the actual population on April 1, 1933 was 161.4 million,15 3.4 higher than
 reported in Urlanis's table.16 This supposed discrepancy, however, is entirely of
 Wheatcroft's contriving. The preceding text indicates that the actual population
 to which Urlanis refers is not that of January 1, 1933, but of the end of 1933,
 "uzhe v moment publikatsii."17 If Urlanis plausibly estimated a 2.7 million net
 population increase between January 1, 1933 and December 31, 1933, the al-
 leged discrepancy between the estimate Wheatcroft derives and the tabular entry
 vanishes.18 Hence the assertion that Urlanis published two mutually inconsistent
 population statistics back to back on adjoining pages cannot be objectively sus-
 tained. His phraseology may to some extent have been ambiguous, but impre-
 cision does not warrant Wheatcroft's inference that he was confused or inept.19
 If Urlanis had concluded that a simple point estimate was scientifically unjusti-
 fied, he could have conveyed this straightforwardly without compromising his
 argument, or exposing himself to criticism for deferring to Lorimer,20 merely by
 replacing the population figure in his table with the bounded interval 158-161.4
 million people.
 Wheatcroft's second line of argument is similarly misguided. He contends
 that the population in 1933 was below the level estimated as late as 1937 by
 Gosplan because the rate of natural increase was smaller than anticipated.21 He
 13. Urlanis, Problemy, p. 318.
 14. Wheatcroft, "New Demographic Evidence."
 15. Wheatcroft implicitly estimates that the Soviet population grew 0.7 million January 1, 1933
 to April 1, 1933 when he asserts that Urlanis's estimate of 158 million April 1, 1933 is equivalent to
 157.3 on January 1, 1933. Adding 0.7 million to the 160.7 million figure he derives from Urlanis's
 discussion of p. 318 yields an alternative estimate April 1, 1933 of 161.4 million people.
 16. Wheatcroft loosely fixes this difference at 2.5 million.
 17. Urlanis, Problemy, p. 318. Novosel'skii and Paevskii's estimates were published in 1934.
 18. Urlanis's estimate for the end of 1933 is 160.7 million. If he estimated a net population
 increase of 2.7 million during 1933, his figure for January 1, 1933 would be 158 million as reported
 in the table. Observe also that the net increase need not be precisely 2.7 because both the 160.7
 and 158 million figures are described as approximations. Ibid.
 19. Wheatcroft cultivates this impression to justify his contention that Urlanis is merely re-
 porting Lorimer's estimate and has no valid independent basis to compute his 1933 population
 estimate.
 20. "But even Urlanis would not have been able to say in print that he thought the estimates
 of the Western bourgeois demographer Lorimer were the best approximate figures available." Wheat-
 croft, "New Demographic Evidence."
 21. Ibid. In my article I stated that "assuming that Gosplan had access to the relevant data
 when this estimate was made in 1937, it appears to follow that all excess deaths calculated from the
 census of 1939 occurred after rather than before 1933." See Rosefielde, "Excess Collectivization
 Deaths," p. 83. Wheatcroft points out that the same estiniate was published earlier in Sotsialisti-
 cheskoe stroitel'stvo. To be more precise, therefore, I should have substituted the words "published
 anew" for "made." The reader can confirm that this correction does not materially alter the meaning
 of my statement, although Wheatcroft tried to make it appear as if the distinction were decisive.
 Compare Frank Lorimer, Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects (Geneva: League of
 Nations, 1946), p. 112.
 512 Slavic Review
 fails to recognize, however, that this discrepancy is irrelevant to my calculations.22
 Excess deaths in table 1 are computed entirely from official ex post, census-
 compatible vital statistics,23 not from Gosplan's 165.7 million population estimate
 of 1933. If my calculations are wrong the fault can only lie in the initial and
 terminal population statistics for 1929 and 193324 and in the vital rates employed
 for the period between 1929 and 1933. The natality rates, as previously ex-
 plained, are postwar statistics for the USSR compiled by Urlanis, which differ
 only slightly from corresponding prewar estimates for the European part of the
 Soviet Union.25 It could be hypothesized that these natality rates are too high,
 but the evidence is wanting. The statistics for 1929 and 1930 are consistent with
 the 1926/27 census data,26 while the rates for 1931 and 1932 are below Lori-
 mer's.27 Any significant exaggeration in my excess death estimates therefore must
 22. Wheatcroft erroneously suggests that I compare Urlanis's statistic with Gosplan's demo-
 graphic projection of 165.7 million in tables 1, 2, and 1A. Similar comments which assume that my
 estimates are biased by natural increase projections are likewise incorrect: "A common cause of
 error is to use a deflated figure for the size of the population in 1933 and a non-inflated figure for
 1931" (Wheatcroft, "New Demographic Evidence"). All the population estimates in table 1 are
 derived from official census data, census-compatible vital statistics, and Urlanis's 1933 fakticheskii
 population statistic. None of these data are derived from projections.
 23. Rosefielde, "Excess Collectivization Deaths," p. 84.
 24. The population statistic for 1929 was computed by adding the natural increase indicated by
 official, published vital rates in 1927 and 1928 to the January 1, 1927 census-based population sta-
 tistic. Corroboration of Urlanis's estimate has recently been provided by Ger P van den Berg, who
 discovered that the population statistics used by Gertsenzon and Shliapochnikov in the 1930s differed
 from officially published data and imply a population of 155.1 million in 1933. (The figures for 1931-
 35 are respectively 160.5, 159.5, 155.1, and 157.5 million). See Ger P van den Berg, The Soviet
 System of Justice: Figures and Policy [Boston, Mass.: Martinus Nijhoff, Kluwer Academic, 1985],
 Demographic Data, table 1, p. 175. Van den Berg comments: "We do not know whether the pop-
 ulation data used by Gertsenzon to calculate the number of sentences for hooliganism per 100,000
 inhabitants are the correct figures, but the publication of these numbers in 1935 at least proves that
 Gertsenzon knew that the population figures for the years 1932-1934 were about 10 million lower
 than the figures published in contemporary official sources" (p. 176).
 25. The postwar rates are employed because they represent an official selection of sometimes
 inconsistent prewar rates, because they were probably adjusted to take account of new information
 and because they cover the entire Soviet Union rather than the European part only. Nonetheless,
 they do have one drawback. They include the natality and mortality behavior of the populations
 annexed to the Soviet Union after September 17, 1939. On balance they should provide a superior,
 but not an ideal impression of prewar vital rates. The differences among the pre- and postwar rates,
 however, are comparatively minor and do not significantly affect the excess death estimates computed
 in table 1. Rosefielde, "Excess Collectivization Deaths," p. 84; Rosefielde, "Excess Mortality in the
 USSR 1929-49: A Rejoinder to Stephen Wheatcroft," unpublished manuscript, July 1985. Compare
 Wheatcroft, "A Note on Steven Rosefielde's Calculations of Excess Mortality in the USSR, 1929-
 1949," Soviet Studies, 36, no. 2 (April 1984): 280, n. 8.
 26. Naselenie SSSR, p. 9; Lorimer, Population of the Soviet Union, p. 114.
 27. Ibid., p. 134. Ger P. van den Berg argues persuasively that Urlanis's natality statistic for
 1932 of 32.6 per thousand may be an average for the years 1931-34. He uses statistics on cohort
 survivors in 1972 to estimate the crude birth rate 1931-34 and obtains the following results: 1931,
 35.6 per thousand; 1932, 37 per thousand; 1933, 29.2 per thousand; 1934, 29.8 per thousand. See
 van den Berg, Soviet System, table 2, p. 177. These alternative natality rates have little effect on
 total excess deaths 1929-39, but they have a profound impact on excess mortality for the period
 January 1, 1929 to January 1, 1933. Excess collectivization deaths increase from 5.8 million (Rose-
 fielde, "Excess Collectivization Deaths 1929-1933," table 1, p. 84) to 7 million shown in table Ni
 below.
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 be explained by the mortality rates. But this possibility is also implausible be-
 cause the official postwar statistics employed are close to the census values and
 do not differ greatly from the prewar figure of 1926/27 for the European part of
 the Soviet Union.28 It follows directly, therefore, that if the 5.8 million excess
 deaths computed in table 1 have innocent explanations, the problem must repose
 in the census data which support the vital statistics rather than in post-census
 reporting deficiencies that might distort these latter rates.29
 Although Wheatcroft does not acknowledge this in his present critique, his
 prior writings indicate that he believes most of the excess deaths implied by
 Table Ni. Excess Collectivization Deaths 1929-33 (van den Berg's Natality Rates 1931 and 1932)
 Population Births per Deaths per
 January 1 1,000 1,000 Births Deaths
 (Thousands) Population Population (Thousands) (Thousands)
 Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 1929 153,740 41.8 [21.4] 6,426 3,290
 1930 156,876 41.2 [21.0] 6,463 3,294
 1931 160,045
 Discrepancy - 6,952
 1931 153,093 [35.6] [20.6] 5,450 3,153












 Discrepancy - 6,952
 Data: The bracketed natality terms were computed by Ger P van den Berg from statistics on cohort
 survivors in 1972; bracketed mortality statistics have been interpolated from average observed
 values 1927-28 and 1937-38. The 1933 population estimate is Urlanis's. The population figure
 for 1929 has been computed with official vital statistics from the 1926 census estimate.
 Sources: Urlanis, "Dinamika urovnia rozhdaemosti v SSSR," in A. G. Vishnevskii, Brachnost',
 rozhdaemost', smertnost' v Rossii i v SSSR (Moscow, 1977), table 3, pp. 11-12; Urlanis,
 Problemy dinamiki naseleniia SSSR (Moscow, 1974), p. 9; Ger P. van den Berg, The Soviet
 System of Justice: Figures and Policy, table 2, p. 177.
 Method: Estimates 1931-32 are extrapolated backward with the formula pt-i = Pt/(1 + CX - f) where
 cx is the birth rate and i is the death rate in year t - 1.
 Comment: Stalin estimated the Soviet population to be 160.5 million at the end of 1930 in his report
 to the Seventeenth Party Congress (1934). See van den Berg, Soviet System, table 1,
 p. 175. This figure is very close to the estimate shown above.
 28. Ibid., pp. 114 and 134.
 29. Wheatcroft argues that intercensus vital statistics are more broadly unreliable than suggested
 here, but his reservations are not directed pointedly at the vital rates in question. See Wheatcroft,
 "New Demographic Evidence," and Wheatcroft, "Population Dynamic and Factors Affecting it, in
 the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s," part 1, CREES Discussion Papers, Birmingham University,
 1976, pp. 2-3.
 514 Slavic Review
 official Soviet demographic statistics are the fictitious consequences of an erro-
 neously low mortality rate based on the census of 1926/27.30 Citing Lorimer, he
 contends that this rate is biased by the underregistration of deaths and by the
 underestimation of mortality in the non-European part of the USSR. This hy-
 pothesis cannot be dismissed, but the evidence supporting it is circumstantial
 and insufficient to sustain cardinal adjustments of any meaningful dimension.
 Lorimer's conjectures about underregistered deaths stem from what he deemed
 to be a suspicious divergence between the lifetable mortality rates of adults over
 25 in the European part of the Soviet Union and Western Europe. On the basis
 of these suspicions he adjusts the lifetables of the 25 + cohort, for the European
 part of the Soviet Union, and then with no further empirical justification similarly
 adjusts the 0-5 cohort; death rates outside the European part of the USSR in
 Buriat-Mongolia, the Far Eastern Territory, and Armenia; and he arbitrarily fixes
 the mortality rate in Central Asia, the Asiatic steppe region, and most of the
 Transcaucasus at a level 80 percent above the census rate.31
 The sole empirical basis for these diverse adjustments, which yield an esti-
 mated 1926/27 mortality rate 31 percent higher than the official figure for the
 European part of the Soviet Union, is the allegedly suspicious mortality behavior
 of the 25 + lifetable rates.32 The suspicions, however, are not supported by stan-
 dard tests of statistical significance, and Lorimer neglects to consider further
 whether the lifetable behavior of Western Europe provides a valid standard for
 judging normal, age-specific Soviet mortality, and derivatively the underregistra-
 tion of deaths in the European part of the USSR. Hence his estimates are spec-
 ulative and have no secure scientific foundation.
 Lorimer's lapse in this regard does not, of course, preclude the possibility
 that evidence confirming his hypothesis may ultimately be forthcoming. Given
 the current state of knowledge, however, the likelihood of this outcome is slight.
 Soviet demographers who are aware of his work33 have shown no inclination to
 follow his lead. Wheatcroft, who believes that Lorimer's adjustments may not
 have been sufficiently bold, has failed to publish any direct substantive proof,34
 while other potentially confirmatory information points compellingly in the op-
 posite direction. If underregistration and incomplete coverage did significantly
 30. Wheatcroft, "Population Dynamic and Factors Affecting it, in the Soviet Union in the 1920s
 and 1930s," part 2, p. 70; and Wheatcroft, "A Note on Steven Rosefielde's Calculations of Excess
 Mortality," pp. 178-79, and nn. 21 and 22, p. 281.
 31. Lorimer, Population of the Soviet Union, pp. 115-19. Other evidence of underregistration
 is discussed, but it is ordinal in character and does not permit precise cardinal adjustments. The
 official 1926/27 mortality rate for the European part of the Soviet Union was 19.9 per thousand. The
 death rate for Central Asia, the Asiatic steppe region, and most of the Transcaucasus was set at 35
 per thousand, in line with the rate reported for Viatka and the Ural regions in 1927, even though
 Lorimer acknowledges that "we have no specific information" about mortality in these regions.
 Compare Sergei Maksudov's critique of Lorrimer's death rate estimate in "How Many Millions
 Perished From 1930-1938?" Russia, nos. 7-8 (1983), pp. 10-11.
 32. Lorimer estimated that the Soviet mortality rate 1926/27 was 26. The official rate for the
 European part of the Soviet Union was 19.9 per thousand. Also see note 30.
 33. Urlanis, Problemy, p. 234.
 34. Wheatcroft, "A Note," p. 181, nn. 21 and 22; and Wheatcroft, "Population Dynamic and
 Factors Affecting it, in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s," part 2, p. 70.
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 distort the 1926/27 mortality rate, this error might have been partly revealed by
 an unanticipatedly high death rate based on the census of 1939. The 1938/39
 mortality statistic, however, was in the vicinity of 17.5 per thousand,35 a figure
 compatible with a 1926/27 based mortality rate of 20.3 per thousand for the
 Soviet Union36 and insufficiently close to Lorimer's 26 rate to sustain his hy-
 pothesis. Moreover, as indicated in table 2 and explained more fully elsewhere,
 the demographic record of the 1940s reveals an exorbitant number of excess
 fatalities unrelated to the war that cannot be attributed to innocent causes with-
 out implying absurd demographic outcomes.37 This finding suggests that excess
 deaths during and before the 1940s are adequately explained by real causes
 including collectivization, famine, the Gulag, and the terror, which should take
 precedence over speculative theories that attribute them to the underestimation
 of the 1926/27 mortality rate.
 Wheatcroft may some day uncover compelling evidence that controverts my
 analysis. But he cannot sustain his present case on the basis of speculative in-
 duction any more than on the over-interpretation of Urlanis's allegedly contra-
 dictory population statistics for 1933, or his misunderstanding of my method for
 estimating excess deaths. The crux of the matter is this: Wheatcroft has no
 credible evidence to substantiate his assertion that Soviet demographic statistics
 do not support more than 3 to 4 million excess "famine" deaths and 6 million
 cumulative excess fatalities between 1926 and 1939. Soviet statistics demonstrate
 clearly that the Soviet Union sustained approximately 5 to 6 million excess fa-
 talities related to collectivization from January 1, 1929 to January 1, 1933.38 It
 is also possible in view of the 1937 population statistic reported by Antonov-
 Ovseenko, broadly corroborated by my own full period excess death computa-
 tions for 1929 to 1949,39 that Urlanis's 1933 population statistics may be over-
 stated by several million people, and that the 15 to 20 million excess fatalities
 between 1929 and 1939 estimated by Murray Feshbach are demographically sup-
 portable. These findings do not settle all outstanding points of controversy,40 but
 35. Naselenie SSSR, p. 9; Lorimer, Population of the Soviet Union, p. 134.
 36. Naselenie SSSR, p. 9.
 37. Rosefielde, "Excess Mortality in the USSR 1929-49: A Rejoinder to Stephen Wheatcroft,"
 p. 85.
 38. See note 27.
 39. Rosefielde, "Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union: A Reconsideration of the Demographic
 Consequences of Forced Industrialization 1929-1949," Soviet Studies, 35, no. 3 (July 1983): 402,
 table 12. Antonov-Ovseenko's 1937 population estimate of 156 million is supported by the Gertsen-
 zon statistics reported by van den Berg, especially if they are overstated as seems likely by the
 exclusion of sample data from the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the North Caucasus, and the Middle Volga.
 See van den Berg, Soviet System, p. 177. Also observe that Gertsenzon's population estimates im-
 plausibly suggest a positive natural increase in 1933. This was a principal famine year. Any significant
 adjustment on this score would place the population as of January 1, 1934 in the vicinity of 152.5
 million, a figure clearly compatible with Antonov-Ovseenko's 1937 census statistic.
 40. Full rebuttals of Wheatcroft's prior criticisms are provided in Rosefielde, "Excess Mortality
 in the USSR 1929-49: A Rejoinder to Stephen Wheatcroft," and Rosefielde, "A Reassessment of
 the Sources and Uses of Gulag Forced Labor, 1929-56." Both manuscripts are available on request.
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 they demonstrate that the demographic cost of Stalin's political and economic
 programs vastly exceeded the few million excess deaths attributable to official
 acts of violence and repression that Wheatcroft may be willing to concede.41
 41. In his impassioned concluding remarks Wheatcroft attempts to seize the high ground by
 asserting that "it is no betrayal of [the millions who died prematurely in this period] nor an apologia
 for Stalin to state that there is no demographic evidence to indicate a population loss of more than
 six million between 1926 and 1939 or more than 3 or 4 million in the famine." This phraseology
 suggests that he had dispassionately considered the counter-evidence, but this is not the case. In the
 sentence quoted above, note that the 5 million excess deaths Feshbach and I have ascribed to
 collectivization have been transformed into excess famine deaths, a separate and comparatively
 innocent probable cause. Compare James Mace, "Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine," Prob-
 lems of Communism, 33 (May-June 1984): 37-50; and Mace, "Response to Stephen Wheatcroft,"
 Problems of Communism, 34 (March-April 1985): 134-38, where he persuasively attributes the
 famine to a deliberate policy of genocide in the Ukraine. Also see Sergei Maksudov, "Losses Suffered
 by the Population of the USSR in 1918-1958," Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique, 1977, no. 3.
 This formulation commits Wheatcroft to very little. As in the past, he is here prepared to accept
 Lorrimer's 5.5 million excess fatalities 1929-1939 as a starting point but then goes on to imply that
 most are imputable to innocent causes including malaria, the hardship of peasant relocation, famine,
 the Soviet-Finnish War, and statistical error. Thus while he acknowledges "excesses," he is puzzlingly
 unprepared to admit that they could be a consequence of Stalin's political and economic policies.
